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Executive Summary  
California’s Fostering Connections to Success Act (commonly known as AB12) was signed into law by 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on September 30, 2010. As a result of this legislation, as of January 1, 
2012, foster youth in California who turn 18 had the right to stay in care until their 20th birthday. Policy 
overhaul of this type is never easy. In this case it was more remarkable because child welfare advocates 
and policymakers in California succeeded in passing this legislation despite a recession, a $40 billion 
dollar state deficit1, and an uncertain governor.  
This report traces the history of the AB12 legislation from when it was first introduced in the California 
State Assembly, through its passage and signing, and ultimately to its innovative and extensive 
implementation planning process. Thus, it covers the period of time from December 2008 through 
December 2011. The aim of this report is to document the California experience, highlighting its 
successes and challenges, so that other states may benefit, potentially smoothing the legislative and 
implementation processes there.  
Beyond telling the story of AB12, this report also focuses on two other issues. The first is detailing the 
strong role played by a group of stakeholders (e.g., advocates, foundations, county administrators, etc.) in 
passing this bill and in seeing it through implementation planning. Understanding more about the role of 
these stakeholders is important for assessing the degree to which their contributions improved upon or 
detracted from policymaking processes. The other major focus is the degree to which research evidence 
was used in both the legislative and implementation planning phase. Knowing more about what kind of 
evidence is most effective in different policymaking scenarios is important if we are to improve policy 
outcomes. 
                                                                
1 This figure is from the nonpartisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office: http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/budget_overview/09-
10_budget_ov.aspx 
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Summary of Findings  
The case of AB12 shows that even in a time of fiscal cutbacks and reduced state capacity, when some 
might expect greater tension between governmental and nongovernmental parties, cooperation and 
collaboration between government and nonprofit stakeholders has the potential to lead to major policy 
change. We believe that our findings about the passage of and implementation planning around AB12 
may be applicable in other situations where (1) the policy under consideration concerns a sympathetic 
population, or where there is wide support for the policy on its face; (2) state budget constraints dominate 
the discussion; and/or (3) government capacity for implementing complex policy is limited. 
First, we find that advocates and other stakeholders from county government and the judicial branch that 
were involved in passing the legislation also played a central role in planning its implementation. Their 
central involvement was a result of their own desire to see the policy through to implementation, the 
limited capacity of state government agencies to implement such complex legislation, and the willingness 
of foundations to help fund implementation planning. Our findings suggest that in this case the 
involvement of these stakeholders led to a highly collaborative and inclusive implementation planning 
process, but they also point to potential tensions. On one hand, such as in this case, a variety of advocates 
and state administrators working together may produce better policy, with greater buy in from multiple 
parties. On the other hand, without sufficient state capacity for oversight, it could lead to reduced 
accountability on the part of government, or the privileging of some voices over others. 
Second, our findings about use of evidence indicate that for research to be effective in shaping legislative 
decisions, it needs to be more timely and geared to policymakers’ concerns than what academic 
researchers generally produce. In particular, research on specific state-level contexts is greatly valued. For 
legislation that concerns sympathetic populations, testimonial or discursive evidence can be just as 
effective with legislators as research evidence. Moreover, in times of budgetary constraint, research 
evidence about cost effectiveness may be as important as research evidence about program or policy 
effectiveness. Two other findings stand out in regards to use of research evidence in implementation 
planning. First, short implementation timelines may reduce use of research evidence overall. Second, both 
state administrators and advocates have preexisting priorities that may or may not be based in research 
evidence; to increase its use, research should be targeted to each group specifically. 
Overall, we find that AB12 is a remarkably generous and flexible policy, with many protections for young 
people and multiple ways that they can stay in the system and access support. This was largely due to 
advocates, foundations, and other stakeholders who were committed to making sure that the program they 
had envisioned and worked so hard to pass was the one that was implemented. Of course, as the policy 
rolls out in 2012, many of those involved remain concerned about lingering implementation issues 
including: training about AB12 for those responsible for its implementation and for the youth it is 
intended to benefit; whether youth will choose to take advantage of the opportunities it provides; whether 
AB12 is flexible enough to ensure that both high-functioning youth and those with more challenges will 
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be able to access desirable placements with more support; and how well AB12 will meet the needs of 
eligible youth involved with the juvenile justice system. 
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Introduction 
California’s Fostering Connections to Success Act (commonly known as AB12) was signed into law by 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on September 30, 2010. As a result of this legislation, as of January 1, 
2012, foster youth in California who turn 18 had the right to stay in care until their 20th birthday.2 This 
legislation has enormous implications, provides opportunities for youth, families, and providers, and was 
long in coming. Advocates had been pushing this type of reform for years based on studies that showed 
poor outcomes for foster youth who age out of care as well as better outcomes for youth who stay in 
care.3 Policy overhaul of this type is never easy, however, and getting the bill passed and implemented 
appropriately took almost five years. It was a major task for child welfare advocates, policymakers, and 
the courts in California. Remarkably, they succeeded in passing this legislation despite a recession, a $40 
billion dollar state deficit4, and an uncertain governor.  
This report tells this unlikely success story, tracing the history of the AB12 legislation from when it was 
first introduced in the California State Assembly, to its passage and signing. It also covers the innovative 
and extensively collaborative implementation planning process that was carried out by the California 
Department of Social Services (CDSS) along with a group of advocates and other governmental and 
nongovernmental stakeholders that had been shepherding the bill since its initial introduction. Thus, it 
focuses on the period of time from December 2008 through December 2011.5 This information is relevant 
for understanding why the policy developed as it did, as well as for stakeholders in other state contexts 
                                                                
2 The law has since been expanded to include youth up to age 21. 
3 Links to much of this research can be found at http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/research.html 
4 This figure is from the nonpartisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office: 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/budget_overview/09-10_budget_ov.aspx 
5 Thus, it does not cover events that happened after the bill went into effect on January 1, 2012, including a 
significant amount of work that went into training, as well as the development of further legislation intended to 
address limitations of the original law. These events will be discussed in a future report. 
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where such a policy change is being considered. Learning from the California experience may help 
smooth the legislative and implementation processes in those states.  
The role of the nongovernmental stakeholders such as advocates, providers’ associations, and 
foundations, is a major focus on this report. How private stakeholders interact with legislators and 
government administrators is an area of increasing interest in both the policymaking and practice 
communities, especially given cutbacks and reduced administrative capacity at the state level (Milward & 
Provan, 2000; Terry, 2005). It is important to know how and when advocates are intervening in 
policymaking at both the legislative and regulatory stages in order to monitor influence and assess the 
degree to which the interests of diverse constituents are being met (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012).  
The other major focus of this report is the degree to which evidence was used in both the legislative and 
implementation planning phase.6 Advocates use many types of evidence: quantitative summaries of 
effectiveness, testimonial evidence, and evidence about potential costs are just a few (Asen, Gurke, 
Solomon, Conners, & Gumm, 2011). Knowing more about what kind of evidence is most effective in 
different policymaking scenarios is important if we are to improve policy outcomes (Nutley, Walter, & 
Davies, 2007). Understanding how evidence is used (or not used) can also bring clarity as to why policies 
come to take a certain shape and help assess the degree to which policy is based on up-to-date knowledge 
(Henig, 2008).  
 
  
                                                                
6 This report focuses on the California state context. Although a federal law was passed that facilitated the California 
law, the degree to which research evidence was used at the federal level is outside the scope of this report. 
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Methodology 
Data collection for this project took place from June through December of 2011. In order to reconstruct 
the policy history and understand the role and perspective of multiple stakeholders, we carried out 38 in-
depth interviews with key stakeholders. These interviews were held in person and over the phone, and 
lasted approximately an hour. Those interviewed included state legislators and legislative staff (N = 6), 
state and county administrators (N = 11), judges and judicial staff (N = 5), and advocates and funders (N = 
16). Interviewees were selected based on their closeness to the process and the role they played (e.g., 
cosponsor of legislation, head of state or county agency, etc.). For example, we interviewed legislative 
staff from both the Democratic and Republican parties, all cosponsors of the legislation, and all key 
figures from the implementation planning group. Interviews were carried out until data saturation was 
reached, and all interviews were recorded and transcribed for later analysis.  
Other sources of data include in person participant observation at stakeholder meetings, notes from open 
conference calls hosted by both cosponsors and CDSS, and document review of the legislative history, 
rules of the court, press releases, meeting agendas, and other communications from advocates. These 
materials served to corroborate the information received from individuals directly. 
Interview transcripts and notes from participant observation, conference calls and document review were 
then analyzed to assess where informants expressed consensus views and where areas of dissent emerged. 
Regarding matters of concern in this report (e.g., legislative history, strengths and weaknesses of the 
implementation planning process, the role of multiple stakeholders, and use of research evidence), we 
primarily found consensus. Thus, in this report, quotes were chosen that represent the consensus view, 
unless otherwise noted. For areas in which interviewees expressed different views, we prioritized the 
viewpoints of those most closely involved in the process but also note where those differences lie. 
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Federal Extension: Setting the 
Stage  
Traditionally, foster care has ended at age 18 for several reasons. Clearly, 18 is the age of majority, when 
children have been historically thought of as “independent.” However, it is also the age at which, until 
recently, federal matching funds for foster care (through Title IV-E of the Social Security Act) ceased. 
Because states depend on those matching funds for their foster care programs, 18 has generally been the 
age when state funding stops as well. Child welfare advocates have generally believed, then, that in order 
for states like California to extend their foster care programs, federal matching funds would have to be 
available. In this way the federal law can be seen as an all-but-necessary precondition to action at the state 
level. Thus, the story of AB12 really begins in Washington, DC. 
Advocates in California, particularly the John Burton Foundation, were actively involved in promoting 
federal support for extended foster care. Armed with new research showing negative outcomes for youth 
aging out of care, advocates, including John Burton himself, had several conversations with Senator 
Barbara Boxer (D-CA) in early 2007. 7 In May of that year, Senator Boxer introduced Senate Bill 1512, 
the first of several bills calling for Title IV-E reform. These bills ultimately came together to form the 
federal Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act (House Resolution 6893, 2008).  
Originally passed in the House of Representatives in June of 2008, the federal Fostering Connections Act 
was signed by President George W. Bush on October 7th, 2008, becoming Public Law 110-351. The bill 
contains several provisions intended to improve outcomes for youth in foster care, but two of the biggest 
changes were offering federal support for subsidized guardianship programs (kinship care) and allowing 
federal reimbursement to states through Title IV-E for foster care provided to youth between the ages of 
18 and 21.  
                                                                
7 John Burton has a storied career in California state politics, and is a powerful political figure in the state, as well as 
nationally, in the Democratic Party. He has served as Senate President, as a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and is currently the Chair of the California Democratic Party.  
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Interestingly, although extending foster care to age 21 is arguably the largest policy change contained in 
the bill, it is downplayed in many of the documents released at the time by both Congress and advocates. 
Less controversial issues—such as increased incentives for adoption and support for grandparent 
caregivers—were given center stage in order to get the support of as many lawmakers as possible. It 
should also be noted that the bill passed as the global financial crisis began. Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy the same day the relevant House and Senate committees announced agreement on a reconciled 
House Resolution 6893. If the committees had waited a few more weeks, passage of a bill like this would 
have been unthinkable. 
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California’s Legislative Effort: The 
Fostering Connections to Success 
Act 
Having followed the federal effort closely, advocates and state lawmakers in California were ready to 
craft their own legislation. California was fortunate to have two longtime supporters of foster youth in 
positions of power in the state assembly: Speaker of the Assembly Karen Bass and Human Services 
Committee Chair Jim Beall. They introduced AB12 on the first day of the legislative session in December 
of 2008, and saw AB12 through to the day it was signed two years later, on the last day it was eligible for 
the governor’s signature.  
Because advocates and other child welfare stakeholders in California had already been monitoring the 
federal legislation, many were quick to jump on as cosponsors of the state legislation.8 Bills proposing 
extended care had previously been introduced in California, but because of the change in federal 
legislation, this time it seemed as though the bill might have a chance of being passed. By all accounts, 
the cosponsors came together somewhat organically, with some advocates being contacted by the Human 
Service Committee staff and others expressing their interest independently. Ultimately, nine organizations 
came together as cosponsors of AB12 and began writing the text of the bill. This strong and somewhat 
unusual group was comprised of people with content expertise, groups with political clout, and groups 
with broad memberships. These were: 
 The Alliance for Children’s Rights 
 California Alliance of Child and Family Services 
                                                                
8 In California it is common for organizational sponsors to partner with the legislative author of the bill. The 
sponsors assist in writing the bill (sometimes taking a lead role, as they did in AB12). Then, the legislators, 
legislative staff, and sponsors collaboratively work together to move the bill forward. 
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 California Youth Connection (CYC) 
 Children’s Law Center of California 
 County Welfare Directors Association of California (CWDA) 
 John Burton Foundation for Children Without Homes 
 Judicial Council 
 Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
 Youth Law Center 
Several of the cosponsors were longstanding child welfare advocacy groups with considerable legal and 
political expertise (e.g., The Alliance for Children’s Rights, Children’s Law Center, Youth Law Center, 
and the John Burton Foundation). The Judicial Council, however, rarely cosponsors bills. Their 
participation underscored the bill’s significance. The Judicial Council also provided critical legal 
guidance and manpower. The California Alliance of Child and Family Services represents most of the 
foster care providers in the state, and SEIU represents the state agency social workers. Having both 
organizations on board was a crucial signal that these important constituencies approved of the bill. 
CWDA is an important power broker in California state politics and their participation signaled that 
counties would support the plan (California has a county-administered child welfare system). As one 
advocate told us, “If CWDA didn’t want this to happen, it wouldn’t have happened. Their commitment to 
it and the amount of political capital they expended to make this policy move forward can’t be 
overstated.” Finally, CYC is an organization comprised of and representing current and former foster 
youth. They were able to provide important substantive feedback about how different provisions in the 
bill might affect youth. Additionally, their personal stories proved essential in convincing legislators of 
the importance of the bill.  
It should be noted that not all the cosponsors are typical “advocates.” The Judicial Council represents the 
judicial system, while the CWDA represents county government. Their cooperation with more traditional 
nongovernmental advocates, including legal advocates, the providers association, and the labor union, is 
partly what led to such a strong coalition. Each group was able to play a unique role and rally their own 
constituents. Ultimately, as one respondent noted, “it was a really committed group of people who were 
all saying, ‘We are going to make this bill happen one way or another.’ There were a lot of workhorses on 
that team of people.” 
The California Department of Social Services (CDSS) does not sponsor bills, thus their name is not on 
that list. Stakeholders who were interviewed had mixed opinions as to the degree to which the agency was 
supportive of the bill in the beginning. People close to the agency reported that the director at the time 
was very supportive and worked hard behind the scenes. Others, however, reported a certain recalcitrance 
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and wondered if the state agency felt able to take on a policy change of this magnitude. Many perceived a 
split at CDSS, and believed that the more policy-oriented staff supported the bill, but that people in the 
financial division were reluctant, believing the policy was going to be more expensive than the 
cosponsors thought it would be.  
Issues of Cost 
Because of California’s budget crisis, it was clear that the bill would have to be cost neutral, or even a 
savings, if it was to be passed. The state was already cutting programs it had long been committed to; 
passing a new, cost-intensive bill was not a possibility. The similar bills that had been floated in the 
California legislature before did not make it primarily because of the fiscal implications. Luckily, the way 
the federal legislation was written gave the cosponsors a way to present the bill as cost neutral.  
California had been paying the full cost of a statewide subsidized guardianship program (Kin-GAP) since 
1998. Because the federal Fostering Connections Act included matching funds for state-subsidized 
guardianship programs, the cosponsors planned to use the funds no longer being spent on Kin-GAP to pay 
for extended care. Unfortunately, soon after AB12 was introduced, the cosponsors learned that the federal 
guidance on Fostering Connections would allow for prospective cases only, meaning California could not 
collect for the approximately 15,000 children they already had enrolled in Kin-GAP. This was devastating 
to their hopes for cost-neutrality.  
The cosponsors carried on, though, assuming that when President Obama took office early in 2009, his 
administration would change the guidance and allow for established cases. They even held a large press 
conference in March of 2009 with researchers, philanthropy, and key figures from all three branches of 
government (leaders of both the Assembly and the Senate, as well as the director of CDSS and key 
figures in the judicial branch) that got a lot of attention and raised hopes for a quick passage.  
Unfortunately, although they were eventually able to get the federal guidance changed, the change did not 
happen as quickly as they hoped and the bill ended up stuck in the Assembly Committee on 
Appropriations from June 2009 to January of 2010. This was enormously disappointing given that the bill 
had easily made it out of the Assembly Committee on Human Services.  
During the period while the bill was in the Appropriations Committee, work on the bill slowed 
significantly. A small group of cosponsors then came up with the idea of a “phase-in” that would 
significantly reduce the upfront costs of the bill. The phase-in eventually got AB12 out of the 
Appropriations Committee and back in play in January 2010. With the phase-in, instead of immediately 
covering all foster youth through age 20, the policy would only apply to youth prospectively. Thus, in its 
first year, AB12 would only apply to youth under 19 years of age, in its 2nd year, youth under 20, and so 
on. The phase-in is one aspect of the bill most lamented by child welfare advocates, as they had hoped for 
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more comprehensive coverage from the outset, but the general consensus is that the bill could not have 
passed without it. 
Three other major compromises also had to be made in the legislative process. These were reportedly 
largely due to the need for additional cost cutting as a result of a threatened “no” recommendation from 
the state finance director’s office (which would have likely resulted in a veto from the governor). The 
first, and for many, the most disappointing, was changing the maximum age of eligibility from 21 to 20. 
The cosponsors had originally hoped to include youth up to age 21 but agreed to only cover youth up to 
age 20 in AB12. They intended to go back to the legislature in 2013 to extend coverage for youth up to 
age 21. Ultimately, the issue got resolved when the extension was included in the state budget passed in 
the summer of 2012.  
The second compromise was the elimination of group homes as a potential placement for most AB12 
youth. Compared to family or kinship foster care, group homes are very expensive placements. Excluding 
them was thought to reduce the likely cost of extending care. Since group care settings also tend to be 
relatively restrictive environments, some hoped that severely limiting the use of group homes under AB12 
would increase the likelihood that youth would be placed in more developmentally appropriate 
placements.  
The third compromise was what is known as the “70/30 split” on a state-funded program called THP-
Plus. THP-Plus, a transitional housing program for youth ages 18–24 in California, is strongly supported 
by the John Burton Foundation and others. It had been implemented by CDSS in 2001 with a requirement 
for county matching of state funding for the program. Due to the requirement of county funding, THP-
Plus experienced limited implementation in its early years, but expanded rapidly after 2006 when 100 
percent state funding was provided for the program. The 70/30 split meant that 70% of the beds 
previously available through THP-Plus would now have to be converted into THP-Plus-Foster Care 
(THP-Plus-FC), essentially earmarking them for youth covered under AB12 (and ensuring they would be 
eligible for federal matching funds, reducing state costs). This raises the concern that youth who do not 
qualify for AB12, or do not want to participate for some other reason, may find it much more difficult 
than in recent years to gain access to quality transitional housing in California under AB12.  
Strategies and Evidence Important in Passing the Bill 
One of the keys to moving AB12 forward was the growth in research evidence regarding the negative 
outcomes experienced by youth who age out of foster care.9 This research was synthesized and promoted 
by the cosponsors, through the use of press releases and press conferences, one-page summaries, and 
                                                                
9 As noted above, links to much of this research can be found at 
http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/research.html 
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other communications. Statistics on poor outcomes were found in almost all their materials. Cosponsors 
talked about this work as important primarily for “laying the groundwork” and “maintaining credibility.”  
In addition to research evidence about outcomes, CYC had been educating the legislature for years with a 
consistent presence and previous bills proposing extended care. As a result, foster youth are widely 
considered a sympathetic population in California. These two things (research evidence and perceptions 
of foster youth as deserving) led to wide consensus among lawmakers that the policy made sense “on its 
face.” This allowed advocates to take advantage of a lobbying strategy that focused more on providing 
information and helping allies achieve their goals than on trying to change legislators’ minds (Hall & 
Deardorff, 2006). 
However, as the bill moved forward and the budget crisis worsened, interviewees reported that evidence 
about potential policy effectiveness became less central in discussions than evidence about its costs. 
Having policymakers become not just supporters but champions of the policy was essential to overcome 
the cost argument. This is important because there was no legal reason why the state could not have taken 
the federal matching funds for Kin-GAP and then used the $35 million savings to the state to “plug some 
other hole,” as one advocate put it. In order to keep that from happening, the cosponsors had to make the 
argument that this population deserved and needed support more than other groups.  
To do this, cosponsors and legislative staff invested heavily in “testimonial evidence”—in particular, the 
sharing of personal stories by former foster youth. Respondents universally reported that this type of 
evidence was among the most influential with policymakers. Every member of the state Assembly and 
Senate had multiple visits from youth, including a day in which the foster youth “shadowed” the member. 
The moving stories of these youth, as well as stories told by several celebrities that championed the cause, 
created widespread support in the legislature, including from many Republicans. These Republican 
members were recruited to give floor speeches and endorse the bill in other ways, with the hope that it 
would be passed with strong bipartisan support, which it was. Ensuring bipartisan support, not just 
passage, was thought to be critical to the governor’s decision to sign the legislation (Dear & Patti, 1981). 
Thus, legislators, convinced by the stories of the youth as well as the research evidence showing poor 
outcomes, were willing to vote for the policy on principle, but only if it could be shown to be budget 
neutral or potentially cost saving. Unfortunately, there was a lot of disagreement between the cosponsors’ 
numbers and the Department of Finance about how much AB12 was going to cost. In this case, 
established relationships between advocates, foundations, and researchers—with foundations playing a 
convening role—were critical to producing the required evidence in the right time frame for it to be 
useful. Specifically, the advocates let their connections in the philanthropic and research communities 
know that data on the cost-effectiveness of extended foster care was necessary, and the foundations 
responded by providing emergency funding to pre-identified researchers. A benefit-cost analysis 
commissioned by California foundations showed that the benefits of extending care outweighed the costs 
by more than two to one, a statistic cited by the governor in his signing statement explaining his support 
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for AB12.10 This cost-effectiveness evidence was cited by several interviewees as crucial to the eventual 
passage of the bill. 
                                                                
10 Courtney, M. E., Dworsky, A., & Peters, C. M. (2009). California’s Fostering Connections to Success Act and the 
costs and benefits of extending foster care to 21. Seattle, WA: Partners for Our Children. 
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Implementation Planning: Policy 
Coproduction and the Stakeholder 
Input Process 
Although the bill was quite thorough, many of the program details were left to be hammered out in the 
implementation planning process, which reflects California’s tradition of emphasizing regulation over 
statute. Thus, to understand how the policy developed as it did, it is important to investigate who was 
involved in that process, how the process evolved over time, and how influence was distributed. 
By all accounts, the implementation planning process for AB12 involved a rare and time-intensive year-
long collaborative process. The cosponsors were involved in helping to shape the regulations in a way 
that was essentially unparalleled for CDSS. As one respondent noted, 
This broad-based implementation group process [was] a real departure for CDSS. I just want to 
emphasize that. In previous efforts, they only worked with the counties, really. [It is unusual] if you 
even get more than a week to look at something. They have really stretched themselves…it really has 
been so much better than they’ve ever done before. 
So, how did the cosponsors and other private stakeholders get such access and influence? They had 
several strategies that helped ensure their continued role in shaping the policy. First, the text of the bill 
itself was largely written by the cosponsors, and they were careful to include language that indicated 
details would be worked out by CDSS with the consultation of stakeholders. The cosponsors knew they 
wanted to continue their involvement with the policy were afraid that when the bill was turned over to 
CDSS that they would be shut out of the process. As mentioned above, the usual process for child welfare 
implementation planning at CDSS is for CDSS to take the lead, while working closely with CWDA, 
because of California’s county-administered child welfare system. Other stakeholders are generally less 
involved. However, many respondents noted they believed CDSS had not always used a sufficiently 
substantive public comment process in the past. As one cosponsor said, “After working on it so intimately 
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for so long, there was a collection of organizations that couldn’t imagine handing it off. Partially, because 
it’s so long and so complex. We felt it was necessary for our organizations to play a role to help the state 
understand it.” 
Second, in response to an early meeting CDSS had with the cosponsors to explain the process they 
intended to use, the cosponsors asked that one person from their group cochair every subcommittee along 
with a CDSS representative. CDSS was reluctant as they were afraid that having so many people involved 
would slow the process down, but the cosponsors were able to convince CDSS that because they had 
written the bill and knew it so intimately, having their expertise on board would be valuable.  
Third, a key reason why the cosponsors were able to maintain such an integral role in implementation 
planning was the limited capacity of CDSS. Because of state budget cutbacks, many state agencies lack 
capacity; CDSS is no exception (they had about a 30% vacancy rate at the time). Furthermore, there was 
no funding specifically set aside for the implementation process, which was sure to be extraordinarily 
complicated because of the amount of revision of existing law and creation of new regulation that AB12 
would require. One respondent described the situation like this:  
They have the expertise. They don’t have the capacity. This is where it’s no fault of their own. The 
California State Government has just cut, cut, cut. The Department of Social Services is cut, cut, cut. 
…Their unit used to have 50 analysts, and now they have 2. We keep passing bills. They keep getting 
fewer people, not more people. 
Limited state capacity heightened the ability of the cosponsors to be involved in several ways. For 
example, with such a high profile bill, all parties wanted to get feedback from those affected by the 
legislation, such as relative caregivers and youth themselves, but CDSS was not staffed sufficiently to 
carry this out. To accomplish the task, then, the cosponsors announced that they were planning on hosting 
a series of large meetings reporting on AB12 development and requesting stakeholder input. Working 
together to use those meetings effectively made sense for CDSS.  
Ultimately, the cosponsors, CDSS, and other relevant stakeholders—such as additional county 
administrators and legislative staff—came together to form the AB12 Steering Committee. To facilitate 
the development of the various policies and procedures related to AB12, five Focus Area Teams (FATs) 
were also developed: Rules of the Court, Fiscal, Outreach and Training, Placement and Program, and 
Eligibility and Rates. Each FAT developed policy recommendations that were then passed on to the 
Steering Committee to review and discuss. Other stakeholders were also given opportunities to provide 
comments when possible, notably at a series of large meetings that were held throughout the summer of 
2011. CDSS then used the FAT recommendations, as well as comments and input from stakeholders and 
the Steering Committee, to draft the required series of All-County Letters (ACLs), which give formal 
guidance to the counties until state regulations are developed.  
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Another type of outside stakeholder—philanthropic foundations—also played an important role in 
moving implementation planning forward and helping the various groups work together. Foundations 
such as the Stuart Foundation and the Walter S. Johnson Foundation were integral in supporting this 
process by paying for meetings and providing a consultant to lead the meetings, help keep the FATs 
organized, and generally keep the group on track. Many of the cosponsors also received philanthropic 
funds to support their participation in the implementation of AB12. This enabled them to not only ensure 
that they had staff members at every meeting, but also assisted them in conducting outreach with 
community stakeholders and holding the large meetings that helped provide leverage with CDSS. As one 
respondent said about the involvement of the foundations, 
That has been enormously—I can’t underscore that enough—helpful in terms of the glue to help 
communication, to coordinate across efforts, to coordinate across external groups, and working to 
keep people on the same page…it was very unique and it’s made the difference between what could 
have been really ugly and what has actually worked. 
Challenges During Implementation Planning 
Unfortunately, the implementation planning process had a very slow start. As of February of 2011 none of 
the FATs had met yet, except for Rules of the Court, which was being headed up by the Judicial Council 
(cochaired by the Children’s Law Center) and benefitted from their greater capacity and formalized 
oversight process. Things really didn’t start coming together until April 2011, which, given that AB12 
was to go into effect on January 1, 2012, gave the group a very short timeline to turn around an enormous 
amount of state code and regulation. As a result, it took a very long time for All-County Letters to come 
out. All the ACLs were supposed to be available by October 1st, but only one was ready on time. Without 
the final instructions included in these letters, counties were left with limited guidance regarding how to 
implement one of the most fundamental changes to child welfare policy in a generation. 
The stakeholder group also found along the way that the original legislation would require “clean-up” 
legislation to be in compliance with federal guidelines and to resolve problems in the bill, particularly in 
the areas of delinquency (many probation youth were also eligible for AB12) and reentry (allowing youth 
to opt in and out of state care under AB12 as their situation changed). Much of this work was 
accomplished through the passage of AB212, chaptered in October of 2011. This additional legislation 
added to the workload of the cosponsors and further slowed down the implementation planning process. 
Another challenge many interviewees noted was soliciting adequate feedback from affected parties—for 
example, youth, relative caregivers, and workers. Participants in the implementation planning process saw 
having a comprehensive stakeholder input process as important for several reasons. First, the cosponsors 
wanted to continue to harness the energy of the many people they had mobilized during the legislative 
effort. Second, because the legislation would not take effect for a year, they felt it was important to keep 
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the members of the field (e.g.. providers and county employees) engaged in the process and ready to act 
quickly on the policies that were being developed. Finally, recognizing the complexity of what they were 
trying to accomplish, they believed it was important to receive feedback on the draft policies from the 
youth, providers, caregivers, court staff, attorneys, and county employees who would ultimately be 
utilizing the policies, to ensure they would work in practice. 
Many strategies were successfully deployed to solicit this feedback—for example, focus groups, large 
stakeholder meetings, and surveys of different youth populations. This was one of the biggest outreach 
efforts most respondents had ever been involved in. However, even when their opinions were being 
solicited, many of those queried came with questions rather than concrete input. Additionally, some 
groups, such as foster families, tribal leaders, and youth probation officers, proved difficult to reach. The 
amount of time and energy required to do this outreach may have slowed down the process further. 
Finally, several respondents noted that the implementation process was harder than the legislative process 
in regards to the working relationship between the cosponsors. During the legislative phase, the different 
groups were all working together for one goal. Once implementation planning started, however, they 
reverted back to their usual camps (legal advocates, county administrators, providers) and had to work 
through conflicting interests. That said, almost all respondents reported that overall, the working 
relationship was very positive and productive, and all sides were motivated to find the best solution for 
youth. 
Use of Evidence During Implementation Planning 
Although research evidence was used somewhat sparingly at the legislative stage, it got much heavier use 
there than at the implementation stage. This is important to note since the implementation stage is where 
the final details of the policy got worked out. This lack of emphasis on research findings during the 
implementation stage was due to a number of things.  
First, and perhaps most importantly, because California was the first state to comprehensively adopt the 
Federal Fostering Connections provisions they did not have models to look at. Not much evidence existed 
about the best way to provide care to youth who were no longer children, but young adults. That said, 
many of the individuals involved in implementation were familiar with the academic research around the 
functioning for former foster youth and utilized that research to the extent they could in the development 
of AB 12 policies. For example, based on research demonstrating the unique needs of pregnant and 
parenting youth and youth involved in the juvenile justice system, they developed special policies to 
accommodate those groups (Courtney, Dworsky, Lee, & Raap, 2010). 
Second, as mentioned, the planning group faced serious time constraints. Because of when the bill passed 
and when it was to go into effect, they had just a year to do an enormous amount of work. Under those 
conditions it was often faster to rely on individuals with established expertise than to seek out what little 
evidence may have been available from other states. None of the parties really had the time or resources 
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to produce or uncover new research evidence. As a result, three or four key individuals that were widely 
considered trustworthy and knowledgeable had an outsized role in what this policy would eventually look 
like. Those individuals likely relied on a combination of their own policy preferences, the input received 
from the stakeholder outreach processes mentioned above, and what research was readily available to 
them. 
Also, some respondents reported that “the lawyers took over.” The ongoing work of several of the most 
influential advocacy groups involved in implementing AB12 (the Alliance for Children’s Rights, the 
Children’s Law Center, and the Youth Law Center) is largely grounded in legal representation of children 
and youth involved with the child welfare system and legal action aimed at reforming public child welfare 
agencies. As noted above, the cosponsors’ ability to influence implementation was related to a lack of 
government capacity due to state budget cutbacks. The state agency literally didn’t have enough capacity, 
in terms of dedicated staff members, to do it on its own. Thus, they benefited from both the time and the 
specific expertise of the cosponsors as well as the work the cosponsors did in soliciting outside input. 
However, due to the influence they had over the process, the cosponsors didn’t have to find evidence to 
convince government administrators to take a certain path; they could just pursue their priorities (although 
CDSS always had final say in any policy that was approved).  
Finally, some state administrators believed that the advocates were not always thinking about how to 
operationalize concepts in practice, and that the advocates spent more time talking about what the service 
should ideally look like than considering what was really possible. This should not be surprising given 
that many of the advocates had little experience actually implementing child welfare services. Bringing 
more available evidence into the implementation process about how to deliver foster care services to 
young adults may have helped rectify this problem. Overall, however, we found that throughout the 
implementation phase a combination of reduced government capacity and little available research 
evidence on what works in practice led to decision making that was not based in research evidence as 
much as it was based in what had the most support among a small group of expert stakeholders and what 
input they could solicit from the field. 
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Conclusion 
As this report has demonstrated, the case of AB12 shows that even in a time of fiscal cutbacks and 
reduced state capacity—a time when some might expect greater tension between governmental and 
nongovernmental parties—cooperation and collaboration between government and nonprofit stakeholders 
has the potential to lead to major policy change. We think that these findings about the passage of and 
implementation planning around AB12 may also be applicable to other situations in which 1) the policy 
under consideration concerns a sympathetic population, or where there is wide support for the policy on 
its face, 2) state budget constraints dominate the discussion, and/or 3) government capacity has been 
reduced, leaving advocates and interest groups to lead the policymaking effort at both the legislative and 
implementation phase.  
Overall, we find that AB12 is a remarkably generous and flexible policy, with many protections for young 
people and multiple ways that they can stay in the system and access support. As one advocate said, “The 
ultimate compliment is at one point someone said, ‘This looks like it was written by a bunch of 
dependency attorneys.’ I was like, ‘Because it was.’” This was also due to the cosponsors who were 
committed to making sure that the program they had envisioned and worked so hard to pass was the one 
that was implemented. For example, the reform of the phase-in, the extension of foster care to age 21, and 
the success of the clean-up legislation can be seen as evidence of how important it is for there to be a 
long-term implementation effort and for those involved in passing legislation to be committed to the 
process, not just in the first round of legislation, but during implementation as well.  
Additionally, according to a CDSS representative, “I would say that the advocates have done a 
tremendous amount of work. Reviewing documents and short turnarounds; they get a lot of credit for 
rolling up their sleeves and putting forth a lot of effort. So it’s not just getting opinions. It’s definitely 
been a collaborative effort.” By all accounts this unusually collaborative implementation planning process 
improved the policy. But it also led to a lot of discussion that may have slowed the process down. For 
implementation planning processes of this type, more time may be needed.  
Outside of this case, however, the implications of this larger role for nongovernmental advocates are 
mixed. On the one hand, a variety of advocates and state administrators working together may produce 
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better policy, with greater buy in from multiple parties (Vigoda, 2002). On the other hand, nonprofit 
advocates tend not to be disinterested parties. They represent specific constituencies with unique policy 
preferences. Because those organizations that are the best resourced and have the strongest existing 
connections are the ones likely to be invited to the table, there is a danger that the viewpoints of 
marginalized communities will be minimized (Montanaro, 2010). In this case, the advocates, for the most 
part, were representing the most marginalized—and working hard to solicit outside input—but the danger 
is there. Future research should explore the degree to which different viewpoints are brought into the 
policy process, depending on the involvement of nonprofit advocates, and assess whether their 
involvement improves policy outcomes. In this case it seemed to bring in more viewpoints, but it is not 
clear if that would hold in all cases. 
As suggested by previous research, our findings about use of evidence indicate that for research to be 
effective in shaping legislative decisions it needs to be more timely and geared more to the concerns of 
specific users than what generally produced by academic researchers (Tseng, 2012). In particular, 
research on specific state-level contexts was greatly valued, but difficult to find. Three other findings 
stand out, though. First, previous research has highlighted that different types of evidence are often used 
in the policymaking process (Asen et al., 2011). We find that for legislation that concerns sympathetic 
populations, testimonial or discursive evidence can be just as (or more) effective with legislators than 
research evidence about effectiveness (Laws, 1997). This is partly because it may push legislators “over 
the hump” when cost is a concern. Second, research evidence about cost effectiveness may be just as 
important as research evidence about program effectiveness during times of fiscal constraint. Third, 
existing networks can play an important role in facilitating access to research evidence.  
At the implementation planning stage, three additional findings stand out. First, short implementation 
timelines may reduce use of research evidence. When time is tight it is easier to turn to established 
experts and trust their judgment. Second, advocates, like policymakers, have preexisting priorities that 
may or may not be based in research evidence. Giving advocates more power in implementation planning 
is unlikely to change the use of evidence, unless the research is targeted to them specifically. This case 
shows that researchers should recognize the increased power advocates and other stakeholders have in the 
policy process and make sure that research is targeting them as well as legislators, legislative staff, and 
government administrators (Huston, 2008). Efforts to forge ongoing connections between researchers, 
advocates, and public administrators may help improve the use of evidence (Jackson-Elmoore, 2005). 
Finally, once policies are actually in play, evidence about whether the policies are working may be 
particularly valuable. In order to keep the policy and build on it, informants were very clear that specific 
state-level evidence about effectiveness and costs will be necessary.  
Of course, as the policy rolls out in 2012, many of those involved have concerns and will be watching a 
few issues carefully. One is the issue of training. Because the ACLs came out so late, training was 
delayed—after all, you can’t train on a policy until it is in place. This has led to concerns about how 
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comprehensive training and education will be, and if youth are reliably getting the right information. Two, 
many people will be watching to see how many youth decide to stay in care, and monitoring numbers 
closely to see if it is clear that this is an opt out policy, not an opt in. Whether or not reentry will go 
smoothly for young adults who choose to leave and then reenter the system is also a concern. A further 
question is whether the highest-functioning youth will be able to more easily access desirable placements 
with more support, like THP-Plus-FC. There is concern that many youth with the greatest challenges will 
be left with little support, especially since group homes were largely excluded as possible placements. 
Similarly, because the policy is particularly complicated when it comes to former probation youth, many 
people will be watching to see how they are included. 
Finally, as the policy moves forward, what will be the indicators of success for AB12? As a first step, 
most of our respondents said they will be looking to see if outcomes for youth have actually improved. 
Are they going to college? What are their employment rates? However, beyond those important goals, 
both CDSS and the advocates had an even larger goal for AB12. As a high-level administrator at CDSS 
said, “There was an interest in not just supporting youth for three more years, but really to try to use the 
extension to kind of change the culture and the way we work with older youth and young adults.” Thus, 
as one respondent put it, the overall question will be, “Have we designed a system that youth will take 
advantage of, that benefits them, and that they feel benefits them?”  
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Additional Resources 
Information on the Federal Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act 
• http://www.fosteringconnections.org/ 
 
Text of bill and other legislative documents related to AB12 
• http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/postquery?bill_number=ab_12&sess=PREV&house=A&author=beall 
 
CDSS All County Letters related to AB12 
• http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/acls.html 
 
California Fostering Connections to Success Act AB12 Primer 
• Developed by the Alliance for Children’s Rights, John Burton Foundation and Children’s 
Law Center 
• http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/pdfs/AB12%20Primer_Updated%206-20-12.pdf 
 
Implementation planning and training documents 
• http://www.cafosteringconnections.org/past.html 
 
THP-Plus Statewide Implementation Project 
• http://www.thpplus.org/ 
 
Additional AB12 Training Resources 
• http://calswec.berkeley.edu/fostering-connections-after-18-ab-12-training-resources 
 
 
Cosponsor information 
 
The Alliance for Children’s Rights http://kids-alliance.org/ 
California Alliance of Child & Family 
Services 
http://www.cacfs.org/ 
California Youth Connection (CYC) http://www.calyouthconn.org/ 
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Children’s Law Center of California http://www.clcla.org/ 
County Welfare Directors Association of 
California (CWDA) 
http://www.cwda.org/ 
John Burton Foundation for Children 
Without Homes 
http://www.johnburtonfoundation.org/ 
Judicial Council of California http://courts.ca.gov/policyadmin-jc.htm 
Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) 
http://www.seiuca.org/ 
Youth Law Center http://www.ylc.org/ 
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